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WHERE BLACK LIVES MATTER LESS: UNDERSTANDING THE
IMPACT OF BLACK VICTIMS ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES IN
TEXAS CAPITAL MURDER CASES FROM 1973 TO 2018
JELANI JEFFERSON EXUM* AND DAVID NIVEN**
ABSTRACT
The systemic disregard for Black lives in America was on full display when
footage of a police officer kneeling on the neck of George Floyd went viral. Mr.
Floyd’s resultant death set off protests declaring that Black Lives Matter
throughout the nation and across the world. While national attention rightfully
turned to demanding police accountability for undue violence, the prevailing
conversation also incorporated at least a declared concern for addressing
institutionalized racism within the criminal justice system and other American
institutions. The term of the day became “antiracism.” With regard to police
killings, the lesson is that police officers disproportionately kill Black people in
this country with impunity because our system of policing encourages such
violence, and our legal jurisprudence protects that use of violence. Combining
the Black Lives Matter declaration with antiracism ideals requires systemic
changes that will directly address the disproportionate and racist outcomes of
policing. When combined with the larger antiracist movement—the call for
antiracist policies across American institutions—the Black Lives Matter
movement provided a powerful model for revealing the historic lack of
protection for Black people as they live and work in this country. Declaring that
Black Lives Matter is a reminder that Black lives have value, too, and ought to
be legally protected. However, even when there is a system that is arguably in
place to vindicate the unjust loss of life, Black people still remain unprotected.
* Jelani Jefferson Exum (J.D., Harvard Law School) is the Dean and Philip J. McElroy Professor
of Law at the University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. Her research focuses on sentencing
reform, as well as issues of race in the criminal justice system. She teaches Constitutional Law,
Criminal Procedure, Sentencing, and Race and American Law, and is on the Editorial Board of the
Federal Sentencing Reporter.
** David Niven (Ph.D., Ohio State University) is an associate professor in the School of Public and
International Affairs at the University of Cincinnati. His research focuses on death penalty policy.
The authors are indebted to David Keys and Ahram Cho of New Mexico State University for their
leadership on this project and their efforts to assemble the database. This Article could not have
been written without their estimable contributions. They additionally thank Sydney Buckley for
invaluable research assistance.
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The application of the death penalty in America reveals the troubling truth that
Black deaths do not matter.
Scholars and advocates have long acknowledged that the death penalty is
disproportionately applied to Black offenders. It is also well known that the race
of a victim is a leading factor in a capital defendant’s risk of receiving the death
penalty, with those convicted of murdering whites significantly more likely to
receive the death penalty than those convicted of murdering Blacks. This Article
takes an in-depth look at statistics covering the sentencing outcomes in capital
murder cases in Texas from 1973 to 2018, revealing the clear evidence that race
matters in the imposition of the death penalty. However, this Article does not
simply join the chorus of voices that have recognized the racial disparity in the
death penalty. Rather, the authors argue that the lesson from the Black victim
effect on the death penalty decision fits into the broader, historic, and presentday context of devaluing Black lives. As the Texas example provides, the
devaluing effect of Blackness is apparent. This is not simply a failure to
recognize the value of Black lives—as the Black Lives Matter movement
exposes—but a reflection of the societal view that Blackness actually reduces
the value and importance of all things—from property to community spaces to
ultimate humanity. In life, Black people are vastly under-protected by the law,
and the same is true for Black people even in a system designed to exact
retribution for death. When we accept the fact that the death penalty reveals that
Black deaths do not matter, then it becomes apparent that there is not an
antiracist fix for the death penalty other than its abolition.
In this Article, the authors present the most comprehensive data ever
assembled on capital murder cases in Texas to affirm that the scope of the race
of victim difference is jarring. This data shows how pervasive race is in death
penalty outcomes. In every single comparison the racial disparity was
statistically significant, and harsher punishment was associated with white
victims than with African American victims, who clearly mattered less. The truth,
of course, is that Black victims matter as much as any, even if the legal system
and society haven’t recognized their value. Within a database of thousands of
cases there are thousands of tragic stories of lives upended by acts of an almost
unspeakable nature. The details differ from case to case, but across all those
thousands of cases the race of victim disparity persists. The math is
straightforward. Indeed, the odds against the patterns seen here—emerging by
chance—are truly astronomical. The race of the victim matters in the Texas
criminal justice system.
As a matter of jurisprudence and policy making, however, the meaning of
this data is uncertain. When legislators debate the death penalty, racial
disparities are among the most frequently cited concerns of opponents of the
death penalty. Supporters of the death penalty, however, dispute both the math
and the meaning of findings of racial disparities, taking particular offense at the
suggestion that race influences sentencing or influences their own views. These

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2022]

WHERE BLACK LIVES MATTER LESS

679

authors argue that abolition is the only corrective approach. We must make the
radical choice to uproot systems, like the death penalty, that allow the anti-Black
biases in our national consciousness to not only thrive, but to be just. To do
otherwise is to perpetuate a system where Black lives matter less.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

680

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:677

INTRODUCTION
In the Summer of 2020, the systemic disregard for Black lives in America
was on full display when footage of a police officer kneeling on the neck of
George Floyd went viral. Mr. Floyd’s resultant death set off protests declaring
that Black Lives Matter throughout the nation and across the world. While
national attention rightfully turned to demanding police accountability for undue
violence, the prevailing conversation also incorporated at least a declared
concern for addressing institutionalized racism within the criminal justice
system and other American institutions. The term of the day became
“antiracism.” With regard to police killings, the lesson is that police officers
disproportionately kill Black people in this country with impunity because our
system of policing encourages such violence, and our legal jurisprudence
protects that use of violence. Combining the Black Lives Matter declaration with
antiracism ideals requires systemic changes that will directly address the
disproportionate and racist outcomes of policing. When combined with the
larger antiracist movement—the call for antiracist policies across American
institutions—the Black Lives Matter movement provided a powerful model for
revealing the historic lack of protection for Black people as they live and work
in this country. Declaring “Black Lives Matter” is a reminder that Black lives
have value, too, and ought to be legally protected. However, even when there is
a system that is arguably in place to vindicate the unjust loss of life, Black people
still remain unprotected. The application of the death penalty in America reveals
the troubling truth that Black deaths do not matter.
Scholars and advocates have long acknowledged that the death penalty is
disproportionately applied to Black offenders. 1 It is also well known that the
race of a victim is a leading factor in a capital defendant’s risk of receiving the
death penalty, with those convicted of murdering whites significantly more
likely to receive the death penalty than those convicted of murdering Blacks.2
This Article takes an in depth look at statistics covering the sentencing outcomes
in Texas capital murder cases from 1973 to 2018 to reveal the clear evidence
that race matters in the imposition of the death penalty. However, this Article
does not simply join the chorus of voices that have recognized the racial
1. See, e.g., Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical
Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 783,
783–88 (1981).
2. DPIC Analysis: Racial Disparities Persisted in U.S. Death Sentences and Executions in
2019, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/dpic-analysis-racial-dis
parities-persisted-in-the-u-s-death-sentences-and-executions-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/YD487S3Q] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020); Executions by Race and Race of Victim, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executions-overview/executions-by-race-and-raceof-victim [https://perma.cc/G5JJ-MGND] (last visited Feb. 14, 2022); Race and the Death Penalty,
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/race-and-death-penalty [https://www.aclu.org/other/race-anddeath-penalty] (last visited Feb. 14, 2022).
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disparity in the death penalty. Rather, it argues that the lesson from the Black
victim effect on the death penalty decision fits into the broader, historic, and
present-day context of devaluing Black lives. Through the example that Texas
provides, the devaluing effect of Blackness is apparent. This is not simply a
failure to recognize the value of Black lives—as the Black Lives Matter
movement exposes—but is a reflection of the societal view that Blackness
actually reduces the value and importance of all things—from property to
community spaces to ultimate humanity. In life, Black people are vastly underprotected by the law, and the same is true for Black people—even in a system
designed to exact retribution for death. When we accept the fact that the death
penalty reveals that Black deaths do not matter, then it becomes apparent that
there is not an antiracist fix for the death penalty other than its abolition.
This Article reports quantitative findings from the authors’ study of Texas
capital murder convictions, documenting the consistent disparity in sentencing
relating to the race of the victim. Finding that the punishments imposed in cases
with Black victims are uniformly lower than in cases with white victims, the
authors consider anew the urgency of the assertion that Black Lives Matter. This
discussion is situated within the larger death penalty debate and considers how
the findings here fit a pattern in which the legal system—in both criminal and
civil matters—tolerates racial devaluation.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents data revealing a stark
disparity in death sentence rates in Texas based on the race of the victim. Part II
situates the findings within the notion of the death penalty as a tool of retribution.
Part III considers how race of victim disparities fit a larger pattern of devaluing
Black lives. Part IV suggests disparities are inherent to the death penalty and
that the sentence is irredeemable.
I. RACE MATTERS: THE NUMBERS
This Article is based on a comprehensive database of 15,394 capital murder
convictions in Texas from 1973 to 2018. 3 Over those four and half decades,
Texas leads the nation in the number of executions. 4 Of those 15,394 capital
murder cases, death sentences were imposed in 5.2% of all convictions. Based
on this outcome, we should expect that the death sentence rate should cluster
around 5.2% for variables that should be unrelated to the imposition of the
sentence, such as race. If race of the victim, for example, is unrelated to
3. Portions of these data were collected via the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(“TDCJ”) through the Offender and Victim Information elements available online and the Public
Information Application (“PIA”) systems. Individual offenders were then tracked through Texas
District Courts (“TDC”) Court Activity Database. Court records on file in each of the districts
provided victim information as well as the weapon(s) used in the crime.
4. Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://death
penaltyinfo.org/executions/executions-overview/number-of-executions-by-state-and-region-since
-1976 [https://perma.cc/CN94-YC7C] (last visited Feb. 16, 2021).
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sentencing, then the death sentence rate should be near 5.2% in both white and
African American victim cases. This proves not to be the case. Rather than
finding roughly proportional results, the data reveals a stark disparity based on
race of victim. As shown in Table 1, death sentences occur in 8.5% of cases with
white victims and 2.7% of cases with African American victims. Thus, far from
clustering near the baseline, cases with white victims were actually three times
more likely to result in a death sentence than cases with African American
victims. This result comports with studies of capital murder cases in numerous
states, including Florida, 5 Georgia, 6 Kentucky, 7 Missouri, 8 North Carolina, 9
Ohio, 10 Oklahoma, 11 and Pennsylvania, 12 that found a strong relationship
between the race of the victim and the resulting sentence. Findings of racial

5. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death
Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1991) (finding cases with white victims to be six times more
likely to receive a death sentence than those with Black victims).
6. David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of
the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 708–10 (1973) (“Georgia’s . . .
death-sentencing rate . . . is .06 (15/246) for [B]lack victim cases versus (85/348) for white victim
cases. . . . [And] as compared to white victim cases, the level of aggravation in [B]lack victim cases
must be substantially greater before the prosecutor will even seek a death sentence.”).
7. Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder
Trials: 1976–1991, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 17 (1995).
8. Jonathan R. Sorensen & Donald H. Wallace, Capital Punishment in Missouri: Examining
the Issue of Racial Disparity, 13 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & THE L. 61 (1995); Michael Lenza et al., The
Prevailing Injustices in the Application of the Missouri Death Penalty (1978 to 1996), 32 SOC.
JUST. 151, 158 (2005) (“[B]lacks who kill whites are five times more likely to be charged with
capital murder than are [B]lacks who kill [B]lacks. Whites with [B]lack victims are half as likely
to be charged with capital murder than are whites who kill other whites.”).
9. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Death Sentencing in North Carolina,
1980–2007, 89 N.C.L. REV. 2119, 2145 (2010) (finding cases with white victims to be
approximately three times more likely to receive a death sentence than those with Black victims).
10. Marian R. Williams & Jefferson E. Holcomb, Racial Disparity and Death Sentences in
Ohio, 29 CRIM. JUST. J. 207 (2001) (finding cases with white victims to be more than twice as likely
to receive a death sentence than those with Black victims).
11. Glenn L. Pierce et al., Race and Death Sentencing for Oklahoma Homicides Committed
Between 1990 and 2012, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 750 (2017) (finding “rather large
disparities in the odds of a death sentence that correlate with the gender and the race/ethnicity of
the victim. . . . [C]ases with white female victims, cases with white male victims, and cases with
minority female victims are significantly more likely to end with a death sentence in Oklahoma
than are cases with non-white male victims”).
12. Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., The Race of Defendants and Victims in Pennsylvania Death Penalty
Decisions: 2000–2010, 37 JUST. Q. 955 (2020).
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imbalance in Connecticut, 13 Maryland, 14 and New Jersey 15 sentencing outcomes
contributed to what were ultimately successful efforts to abolish the death
penalty in those states. 16
A.

The Startling Effect of the Victim’s Race

As a matter of both math and logic, unbiased processes should produce
unremarkable patterns. That is, an unbiased coin flipped hundreds or thousands
of times should land on heads roughly half the time and land on tails roughly
half the time. Were a coin flipped a thousand times to land on heads twice as
often as it lands on tails, the results would defy even the most generous statistical
boundaries of what a fair coin could produce. Thus, we would conclude that
some element of the process has biased the outcome and led to the pattern
observed. If race does not affect the criminal justice system, we should expect
the race of the victim to be unrelated to the outcome of the case. That is, an
unbiased process examined across hundreds or thousands of cases should
produce roughly the same punishment for crimes against white victims as it does
for crimes against African American victims. Table 1 suggests this is not the
case.
Table 1. Death Sentence Rate by Race of Victim
All Cases/All Offenders
White Victim
African American Victim

Death Sentence Rate
8.5
2.7
p < .00001
n = 11,822

The scope of that gap—between results that would suggest neutrality and
the results actually found here—is conveyed by a measure of statistical
13. John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System
Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 11 EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 637 (2014).
14. Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of the
Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978–1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIG., GENDER, & CLASS 1 (2004).
15. David C. Baldus et al., Race and Proportionality Since McCleskey v. Kemp, (1987):
Different Actors with Mixed Strategies of Denial and Avoidance, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
143 (2007).
16. Scherzer argues the proportionality review process in New Jersey served to both limit the
use of the death penalty in New Jersey and undergird arguments for abolition, see Aaron Scherzer,
Note, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in New Jersey and Its Impact on Our Nation’s Evolving
Standards of Decency, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 223, 237–40 (2009). Niven and Donnelly find that
references to racial disparities were a major theme among legislators in Connecticut who voted to
abolish the death penalty, see David Niven & Ellen A. Donnelly, Who Challenges Disparities in
Capital Punishment?: An Analysis of State Legislative Floor Debates on Death Penalty Reform, 18
J. ETHNICITY IN CRIM. JUST. 95 (2020).
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significance. In brief, statistical significance tells us the odds of a result
occurring by chance alone, even if there were no underlying relationship. Hence,
a perfectly fair coin flipped one hundred times could land on heads fifty-one
times—not because of bias, but by luck alone. Such an outcome would not be
statistically significant. Social science research typically employs a statistical
significance standard of one in twenty or one in one hundred. That is, when the
odds associated with a result are one in twenty or higher against something
happening by chance, then the result is considered evidence of something
systematic. 17 With regards to the data from Texas, the likelihood that a race
neutral process could produce the disparity shown in Table 1 across more than
11,000 cases is not one in twenty or one in one hundred, rather it is one in
180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000. By comparison, the odds of winning the Powerball lottery are one in
292,201,338. 18 In other words, the odds of selecting the winning Powerball
lottery ticket number on one’s first try are quite literally trillions of times better
than seeing this disparity in race of victim sentencing in Texas happen by
chance.
B.

The Effect of the Victim’s Race Across Defendant Demographics

As Table 2 shows, the race of the victim remains consequential even as we
consider the race of the defendant. In cases with an African American defendant,
7.4% of cases with a white victim result in a death sentence. That number is
4.8% when both the defendant and victim are African American. Again, this
result is statistically significant, falling far outside the boundaries of what we
would expect to see if the race of the victim was unrelated to the outcome of the
case.
Table 2. Death Sentence Rate by Race of Victim & Offender
White Victim
African American
Victim

White Defendant
15.6
1.2

African American Defendant
7.4
4.8

p < .00001

p < .00001

While cases with African American defendants fail to cluster around the
mean, a far larger disparity exists among cases with a white defendant. Again,
5.2% is the baseline across all cases. That is the figure around which nondeterminative variables should cluster. Yet, when a white defendant is accused

17. Baldus, Woodworth, and Grosso, for example, note racial disparities with a 1 in 20 (p =
.05) probability in their analysis of New Jersey death sentences. Baldus et al., supra note 15, at 155.
18. For details on the odds of winning Powerball, see POWERBALL, https://www.powerball
.com/games/home [https://perma.cc/8JYB-4SC4] (last visited Feb. 16, 2021).
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of murdering a white victim, a death sentence is imposed in 15.6% of cases.
When a white defendant is accused of murdering an African American victim,
death sentences are imposed in 1.2% of the cases. The odds that a race neutral
process could produce such a vast disparity is a farcical one in
384,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000.
Imagine officials stepping to midfield before the Super Bowl, about to flip
a coin to determine who gets the ball first. If that coin was found to land on heads
thirteen times more often than tails, it would be headline news. There would be
an investigation and condemnation of the intolerable bias at hand. Fair processes
do not result in thirteen-to-one disparities. But the data here are not about the
trivial matter of which team gets the ball first in a football game. Rather these
data concern the implicit value of lives and the nature of justice. More to the
point, the data suggest that Black lives matter less in the Texas criminal justice
system. And, the fact that we see these skewed results across the country show
that Black lives matter less across the nation. This is not a truth that officials
typically welcome. Professor Randall Kennedy asserts that one of the ironic side
effects of the triumphant social movement to stigmatize racism in the United
States is that it has rendered courts and other government actors hesitant to label
any actor or outcome racist. 19 “Perhaps their sense of shamefulness of racism is
so intense that they find it difficult to burden an official or agency with the moral
opprobrium that the ‘racist’ label connotes,” Kennedy writes, “leading courts to
dismiss most allegations of bias by applying almost impossibly high standards
of proof.” 20
Those charged with defending a criminal justice system against charges of
racial disparity often suggest that some factor other than race is the source of the
disparity. 21 For example, the classic defense against racial disparity data is the
claim that the nature of the crimes being prosecuted is correlated with the race
of victim—and thus, it is the nature of the crime that produces the disparity in
case outcomes. However, a closer look at the data reveals the unsoundness of
this focus on other factors to explain the racial disparities.
C. The Excuse of “Other Factors”
A desire to explain away racial disparities in the death penalty outcomes as
something other than anti-Black bias was evident as early as 1987 in the key

19. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1418 (1988).
20. Id.
21. See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity:
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 19–22 (2013)
(discussing various possible sources of racial disparity in sentencing).
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case, McCleskey v. Kemp. 22 In that case, Warren McCleskey, a Black man, had
been convicted of two counts of armed robbery and one count of murder in
Fulton County, Georgia. 23 His convictions arose out of the killing of a white
police officer during the robbery of a furniture store. 24 A jury convicted
McCleskey of murder, and, after a sentencing hearing, the jury recommended a
death sentence. 25 The court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced
McCleskey to death. 26 On appeal, McCleskey raised several issues, including
claims that the Georgia capital sentencing process was administered in a racially
discriminatory manner, violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 27 In
support of his claim, McCleskey pointed to a statistical study performed by
Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth (“the
Baldus study”) that showed “a disparity in the imposition of the death sentence
in Georgia based on the race of the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race
of the defendant.” 28 The Baldus study concluded that, “even after taking account
of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white victims were
4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing
[B]lacks,” and “[B]lack defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death
sentence as other defendants.” 29 Ultimately, the Baldus study indicates that, as
a Black defendant convicted of killing a white victim, McCleskey was in the
class of individuals with “the greatest likelihood of receiving the death
penalty.” 30
In its arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, the State of Georgia went
to great lengths in order to explain away racial disparities in death sentences. 31
22. McCleskey v. Kemp, 41 U.S. 279 (1987).
23. Id. at 283.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 284.
26. Id. at 285.
27. McCleskey, 41 U.S. at 286 (1987).
28. As the Supreme Court explained in McCleskey: “The Baldus study is actually two
sophisticated statistical studies that examine over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia
during the 1970’s. The raw numbers collected by Professor Baldus indicate that defendants charged
with killing white persons received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants charged
with killing [B]lacks received the death penalty in only 1% of the cases. The raw numbers also
indicate a reverse racial disparity according to the race of the defendant: 4% of the [B]lack
defendants received the death penalty, as opposed to 7% of the white defendants. Baldus also
divided the cases according to the combination of the race of the defendant and the race of the
victim. He found that the death penalty was assessed in 22% of the cases involving [B]lack
defendants and white victims; 8% of the cases involving white defendants and white victims; 1%
of the cases involving [B]lack defendants and [B]lack victims; and 3% of the cases involving white
defendants and [B]lack victims.” Id.
29. Id. at 287.
30. Id.
31. R.J. MARATEA, KILLING WITH PREJUDICE: INSTITUTIONALIZED RACISM IN AMERICAN
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 88 (2019).
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During oral arguments, Georgia’s deputy attorney general told the Justices that
“white victim cases are qualitatively different from [B]lack victim cases,” later
elaborating that Black victims were more likely to be murdered in “a barroom
quarrel, if you will.” 32 Georgia presented no data on barroom quarrels or any of
their other allied assertions. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s decision denying
McCleskey’s constitutional claims suggests that the racially disparate outcomes
are somehow explainable by something other than discrimination by the
decisionmakers.
In holding that there was no constitutional violation in McCleskey’s case, 33
the Supreme Court reasoned:
Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand
exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been
abused. The unique nature of the decisions at issue in this case also counsels
against adopting such an inference [of discriminatory purpose] from the
disparities indicated by the Baldus study. 34

The Court’s preoccupation with the special nature of discretion suggests that it
was leaving open the possibility that there could be many factors—beyond
simply race—that informed the decisionmakers’ choice to impose a death
sentence. But, of course, that conclusion is exactly what the Baldus study was
refuting. However, the Court dismissed the significance of the study’s findings
and curtly stated that the Baldus study was “clearly insufficient to support an
inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case acted with
discriminatory purpose.” 35 In other words, there must be some other perfectly
acceptable explanation for the racially disparate outcomes. The history of the
death penalty in Georgia belies that assumption, 36 and similar excuses remain
faulty with regards to today’s death penalty statistics.
For the moment, leave aside the dicey logic that ungirds the expectation that
the details of murder cases vary systematically by race. The more fundamental
point here is that even when we pull these capital cases apart by particular details
32. Id.
33. Prior to McCleskey, the Supreme Court had already established that “[p]roof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause” and
that “absent a ‘stark’ pattern,” “impact is not determinative” in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977).
34. McCleskey v. Kemp, 41 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
35. Id.
36. See Ursula Bentele, The Death Penalty in Georgia: Still Arbitrary, 62 WASH. UNIV. L.Q.
573, 580–84 (1985) (describing the wide variety of aggravating circumstances that fit into the
capital category which “make[] the unbridled discretion of juries . . . particularly dangerous,”
because if the defendant “fits into one of the categories eligible for capital punishment, any reason,
or no reason, can serve to place him on death row. It does not matter whether the jury chooses to
execute him because he was [B]lack, or poor, or psychotic”); Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution
Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1334–41 (1985) (describing
the origins of the modern death penalty in Georgia).
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of the crime, the race of victim disparity persists. For example, death sentence
rates in the Texas data vary by the weapon used in the crime. Across these Texas
cases, those accused of murdering by use of their hands are the most likely to be
sentenced to death. Meanwhile, murder with a blunt object or a knife is more
likely to result in a death sentence than murder by firearm. But even as those
details are unquestionably consequential to the outcome of the case, the race of
victim disparity persists across every category of weapon. Cases with white
victims are more likely to result in death sentences than cases with African
American victims if the crime was committed with a gun. 37 Or if the crime was
committed with a knife. 38 Or with a blunt object. 39 Or with the assailant’s
hands. 40 Or with another object. 41
As an example, Table 3 shows the death sentence rate in firearm cases.
Mirroring the overall data, we again see a disparity by race of victim in cases
with African American defendants. Moreover, with white defendants we again
see a massive race of victim disparity, with white victim cases being ten times
more likely to result in a death sentence than African American victim cases.
Table 3. Death Sentence Rate by Race of Victim & Offender
Firearm Cases Only

White Defendant

White Victim
African American
Victim

14.9
1.39

African American
Defendant
7.59
5.0

p < .00001
n = 2367

p < .005
n = 2943

Even when we remove cases that resulted in death sentences from the
analysis, the data still reveals a race of victim disparity. Table 4 shows the
average sentence (in years) imposed in cases that did not result in a death
sentence. Consistent with the previous data, once again we find a disparity, with
harsher punishment imposed on those convicted of murdering a white Texan.
With sentencings about four years longer for white victims than African
American victims, we once again see a highly statistically significant difference.
37. In the authors’ dataset, the death sentence rate is 7.7% in cases where a gun was used
against a white victim and 2.7% in African American victim cases.
38. In the authors’ dataset, the death sentence rate is 10.7% in cases where a knife was used
against a white victim, and 4.7% in African American victim cases.
39. In the authors’ dataset, the death sentence rate is 11.2% in cases where a knife was used
against a white victim, and 3.8% in African American victim cases.
40. In the authors’ dataset, the death sentence rate is 92.7% in cases where a white victim was
killed with the assailant’s hands, and 78.9% in African American victim cases.
41. In the authors’ dataset, the death sentence rate is 3% percent in cases where something
other than a gun, knife, blunt object, or the assailant’s hands were used against a white victim, and
1.3% in African American victim cases.
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By eliminating death sentences from consideration, this comparison removes
cases that ostensibly represent the worst and most heinous crimes. And yet the
disparity in race of victim punishment remains. It cannot be a function of the
unique nature of capital sentencing cases since the same dynamic applies to the
entire body of cases.
Table 4. Length of Sentence by Race of Victim
White Victim
African American Victim

Sentence in Years (mean)
51.3
47.5
p < .00001
n = 11,139

II. THE DEATH PENALTY’S RETRIBUTION PROBLEM
The Supreme Court has maintained that the death penalty satisfies the
retribution and general deterrence theories of punishment. 42 In Eighth
Amendment cases examining claims of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, the
Court explains that “capital punishment is excessive when it is grossly out of
proportion to the crime or it does not fulfill the two distinct social purposes
served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.” 43 In
addressing retribution, which measures an offender’s moral desert, 44 the
Supreme Court expounds that “capital punishment must be limited to those
offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose

42. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (“The death penalty is said to serve two
principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.”).
43. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008).
44. Retribution punishes in accordance with philosophical views on just desert and moral
blameworthiness. Deontological retribution focuses “on the blameworthiness of the offender, as
drawn from the arguments and analyses of moral philosophy.” Paul H. Robinson, Competing
Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145,
148 (2008). This deontological approach to retribution comes from the work of Immanuel Kant.
See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS 101 (John Ladd transl., 1965). For another traditional account of retribution, see
G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 98 (S.W. Dyde transl., 1896) (1821). For a modern
retributivist view, see Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?
Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157,
2193 (2001). In its empirical form, retribution “focuses on the blameworthiness of the offender.
But in determining the principles by which punishment is to be assessed, it looks not to
philosophical analyses but rather to the community’s intuitions of justice.” Robinson, supra note
44, at 149; see also Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The
Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 211, 217 (2012) (explaining “the crime-control benefits from distributing punishment
according to people’s shared intuitions of justice”).
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extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.” 45 The
mitigating and aggravating factors that jurors consider in the capital sentencing
decision are designed to identify the worst of the worst offenders. In terms of
retribution, it stands to reason, then, that juries decide to sentence offenders to
death when they are convinced that those aggravating factors indicate a level of
moral blameworthiness for which a life sentence would be an insufficient
punishment. The decision faced by capital jurors “is the highly-charged moral
and emotional issue of whether the defendant, notwithstanding his crimes, is a
person who should continue to live.” 46
The statistics on the impact of a victim’s race are evidence of the failures of
retributivist punishment. Retribution, by its very nature, requires the sentencing
decision makers to impose their own view of value upon the defendant. One
cannot assess the moral desert of another without assessing the significance of
the harm caused by that person weighed against the individual’s redemptive
worth. Some scholars argue that the reason for the racially disparate capital
punishment decisions is that capital jurors, who are mostly male and mostly
white, 47 may not be able to identify with Black capital defendants and may
identify more with the victim when the victim is white. 48 In other words, “jurors
may have a difficult time empathizing with mitigating evidence presented by
Black defendants and, conversely, victim impact testimony might
disproportionately magnify the loss of White victims compared to non-White
victims.” 49 Said more bluntly, jurors see less loss when the victim is Black, and
less redeemability when the defendant is Black. 50 Additionally, scholars have
theorized that retribution is “inextricably tied to race,” and therefore “cannot be

45. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)).
46. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 299, 334–35 (1983).
47. Justin D. Levinson et al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on
Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U.L. REV. 513, 544 (2014) (explaining
that the process of death qualification leads to capital juries that are mostly comprised of white
males).
48. Id. at 534–44 (discussing how racial stereotypes affect white jurors in capital cases).
49. Id. at 517.
50. See Levinson et al., supra note 47, at 518 n.9. This blunt point often gets lost—or
sanitized—by labeling it implicit bias. For discussions on implicit bias in the death penalty context,
Levinson suggests the following resources involving implicit bias social science research: Implicit
Racial Bias: A Social Science Overview, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 9 (Justin D.
Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012); Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured,
in THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117, 123 (Henry
L. Roediger III et al. eds., 2001) (giving “a more theoretical perspective underlying work on
implicit bias”); Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes,
Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995).
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contemplated without also considering the corresponding impact” of racial
arbitrariness. 51 Professor Justin Levinson has explained it in this manner:
[T]he tendency to punish crimes against White [sic] Americans more severely
should have been reduced by the combination of channeling society’s taste for
retribution into the formal justice system and requiring heavy anti-arbitrariness
procedural regulation in the administration of capital punishment. This has not
been the case. 52

This view takes issue with the adequacy of the death penalty process, requires
room for retribution, yet allows for racial bias to influence that retributive
determination, thus leading to arbitrariness. The Supreme Court has plainly held
that death may not be imposed in an arbitrary manner. 53 However, the term
“arbitrary” makes outcomes sound unpredictable, which the data shows is not
the case. As explained previously, the statistics in Texas and throughout the
country are not rooted in mere chance. Instead, the data demonstrates that race
matters in the capital sentencing context. The racially disparate outcomes that
we are witnessing in the death penalty decisions—which exist across relevant
case factors—highlight that jurors are
[E]xpressing [the] retributive sentiments as their community of death qualified
jurors see things—that [B]lack capital defendants are more morally
blameworthy than white capital defendants; that defendants who have taken the
life of a white person are especially deserving of the death penalty; and that
[B]lack defendants who take the life of a white person are the worst of the worst
capital defendants. 54

In the death penalty context, the Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of the jury as the exactors of retribution. In January 2016, the
Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida, in which it examined Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme. 55 Under Florida law, “the maximum sentence a capital felon
51. Levinson et al., supra note 47, at 517, 541.
52. Id. at 541.
53. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“[T]he death penalty . . . [can]not
be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in
an arbitrary and capricious manner.”) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White,
J., concurring)). Indeed, Justice Marshall raised concerns about the risk of “arbitrariness” in his
McCleskey dissent. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 322–23 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall asserted that, since Furman, the “Court had been concerned with the
risk of the imposition of an arbitrary sentence, rather than the proven fact of one.” Id. at 323. The
“emphasis on risk acknowledges the difficulty of divining the jury’s motivation in an individual
case,” and “reflects the fact that concern for arbitrariness focuses on the rationality of the system
as a whole, and that a system that features a significant probability that sentencing decisions are
influenced by impermissible considerations cannot be regarded as rational.” Id.
54. Jelani Jefferson Exum, Should Death Be So Different?: Sentencing Purposes and Capital
Jury Decisions in an Era of Smart on Crime Sentencing Reform, 70 ARK. L. REV. 227, 244–45
(2017).
55. 577 U.S. 92, 94 (2016).
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may receive on the basis of the conviction alone [was] life imprisonment.” 56
Similar to other states, Florida law only authorized the conviction for a capital
offense to carry life imprisonment and required the finding of additional
aggravating factors in order for death to be imposed on the defendant. 57
However, Florida’s capital procedure allowed an advisory jury to make a
recommendation to a judge, who then would make the final findings needed to
impose a death sentence. 58 Death could only be imposed if a separate sentencing
hearing “result[ed] in findings by the court that such person shall be punished
by death.” 59 Because this death penalty sentencing procedure exposed a
defendant to a higher punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty
verdict, the Supreme Court ultimately held that it violated the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial. 60 The Court made clear in its holding that when state law
only allows for a death sentence when certain aggravating factors are present, it
must be the jury, and not the judge, who finds the existence of those facts that
make death appropriate. 61 In other words, in these types of situations, it must be
the jury who finds that retribution and/or deterrence requires the imposition of
the death penalty in an individual case. In Ring v. Arizona, a 2014 case relied
upon by the Hurst Court, Justice Breyer found the jury essential in carrying out
the retributive justification for capital punishment. 62 As he explained in his
concurrence:
In respect to retribution, jurors possess an important comparative advantage over
judges. In principle, they are more attuned to “the community’s moral
sensibility,” because they “reflect more accurately the composition and
experiences of the community as a whole[.]” Hence they are more likely to
“express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death,”[] and better able to determine in the particular case the need for
retribution, namely, “an expression of the community’s belief that certain crimes
are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate
response may be the penalty of death.” 63

Of course, Justice Breyer’s words are expressing a pristine idea that is
sullied by reality. It may be true that juries are more capable than judges of

56. Id. at 92.
57. Id. at 94.
58. Id. at 95–96.
59. Id. at 92 (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)).
60. Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 103 (2016).
61. Id. at 102–03 (“Florida’s sentencing scheme, which required the judge alone to find the
existence of an aggravating circumstance, is therefore unconstitutional.”).
62. 536 U.S. 584, 614–15 (2014) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“As to the first, I note the continued
difficulty of justifying capital punishment in terms of its ability to deter crime, to incapacitate
offenders, or to rehabilitate criminals. Studies of deterrence are, at most, inconclusive.”).
63. Id. at 615–16 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984),
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), & Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
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reflecting the conscience of the community. But our persistent racial disparities
in capital sentencing show us that the “certain crimes”—that “are themselves so
grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response” is the death
penalty—are routinely those crimes that take the lives of white people, and not
those crimes that result in the death of Black people. And, in that way, juries are
actually expressing the true racist sentiments of their communities. A version of
this form of “race-based retribution” 64 was on display in the 2017 Supreme
Court case Buck v. Davis. 65 The case, a procedural nightmare, involved
questions regarding the proper standard for certificate of availability, as well as
what constitutes extraordinary circumstances for a Rule 60(b) motion to reopen
a final judgment. 66 However, what is most relevant to this discussion was the
basis for Defendant Duane Buck’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Buck’s own expert psychologist witness testified at his sentencing hearing that
being Black was a “statistical factor” that increased Mr. Buck’s probability of
being a danger in the future. 67 “‘Future dangerousness’ [of the defendant] is one
of the ‘special issues’ that a Texas jury must find to exist—unanimously . . .
before a defendant may be sentenced to death.” 68 The purported expert’s reasons
for using race in this assessment was nothing regarding the particular defendant,
but instead his “expert” opinion was based on the “‘sad commentary that
minorities, Hispanics and [B]lack people[] are over represented in the Criminal
Justice System.’” 69 On cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to clarify this
position, asking: “You have determined that the sex factor, that a male is more
violent than a female because that’s just the way it is, and that the race factor,
Black, increases the future dangerousness for various complicated reasons; is
that correct?” 70 The “expert” answered, “Yes.” 71 In other words, this
psychologist explained how Blackness makes someone statistically more likely
to be a future danger than a white person. Under Texas law (and the law of many
other states), likely future dangerousness is one of the aggravating factors that
jurors are required to consider in their capital sentencing decision. 72 In short,
under this psychologist’s assessment, being Black means being more likely
64. Exum, supra note 54, at 246.
65. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).
66. Id. at 767.
67. Id. at 768 (“In determining whether Buck was likely to pose a danger in the future, [Buck’s
second expert] considered seven ‘statistical factors.’ The fourth factor was ‘race.’ His report read,
in relevant part: ‘4. Race. Black: Increased probability. There is an over-representation of Blacks
among the violent offenders.’”); Brief for Petitioner, Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2016) (No. 158049), 2016 WL 4073689, at *5, *7.
68. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at *5 (citing TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2).
69. Id. at *7.
70. Id. at *7–8.
71. Id. at *8.
72. See Carla Edmonson, Nothing Is Certain but Death: Why Future Dangerousness
Mandates Abolition of the Death Penalty, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 857, 859–60, 862 (2016).
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deserving of the death penalty than others. This is race-based retribution. Mr.
Buck was sentenced to death. 73 The Supreme Court’s reversal of the decision
below and remand for further consideration indicates that the Court agreed that
race-based retribution was at play. The Court stated:
Given that the jury had to make a finding of future dangerousness before it could
impose a death sentence, [the expert’s] report said, in effect, that the color of
Buck’s skin made him more deserving of execution. It would be patently
unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant is liable to be a future danger
because of his race. 74

Thankfully, the Supreme Court condemned this use of race as a proxy for
blameworthiness in Mr. Buck’s case. However, what the Court has failed to
do—since the days of McCleskey—is recognize that race-based retribution is
what routinely occurs in capital cases. A closer look at the effect that the race of
victims plays in the death penalty reveals the unfortunate truth: that Black lives
are not valued, and therefore, the act of killing Black people is less worthy of
death than killing whites.
III. THE BLACK EFFECT: HOW THE VICTIM DISPARITIES IN THE DEATH
PENALTY FIT INTO THE PATTERN OF DEVALUING BLACK LIVES
Something quite illuminating is revealed when capital cases are examined
with regard to the number of victims. Unsurprisingly, multiple victim cases are
far more likely to result in a death sentence than cases where there is a single
victim. But here again, it is found that there is a racial disparity in single victim
cases and a racial disparity in multiple victim cases. The results in Table 5 below
reveal a meaningful disparity based on race of victim when the defendant is
African American. In such instances, cases are about twice as likely to result in
a death sentence with a white victim relative to cases with an African American
victim. Once again, an even larger disparity applies when the defendant is white,
with death sentences occurring eleven times as frequently with white victims
relative to African American victims. Multiple victim cases—which are a small
subset of the total database—reveal that even in a category of cases in which
death sentences are far, far more common, the race of victim disparity
nonetheless persists. With white defendants and multiple African American
victims, death sentences are imposed in 12.5% of cases. With white defendants,
at least one African American victim, and at least one white victim, death
sentences are imposed in 18.75% of cases. With white defendants and multiple
white victims, death sentences are imposed in 74% of cases. These figures
suggest a truly profound scope of difference in the treatment of white victim and
African American victim cases. Adding just one Black victim to the pool of

73. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at *8.
74. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775, 780 (2017).
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victims drastically reduces the likelihood of the death penalty being imposed. A
conviction for murdering multiple whites is highly likely to result in a death
sentence. A conviction for murdering multiple African Americans in Texas is
highly likely to result in avoiding a death sentence.
Table 5. Death Sentence Rate by Race of Victim & Offender
Single Victim Cases

White Defendant

White Victim
African American Victim

11.9
1.08
p < .00001

African American
Defendant
5.97
2.9
p < .00001

Another way to contemplate that startling data is to consider the roughly
equal likelihood of a death sentence for a white defendant convicted of
murdering multiple African Americans relative to white defendants convicted of
murdering one white victim. Which is to say, in the realm of prosecutions, it
takes multiple African American lives to equal the value of one white life. This
clear devaluing of Black lives fits within historic and present-day realities for
Black Americans.
A.

The Explicit Devaluation of Black Lives: “Most likely only a negro”

Scholars have studied the concept of “devaluation” and how it plays out in
various legal contexts. Though the Texas death penalty data shows a devaluation
of Black lives compared to white lives, it is important to understand that
“[d]evaluation affects the way we value activities, institutions, injuries, and
other ‘things,’ which, strictly speaking, have no race or gender.” 75 As Professor
Martha Chamallas explains:
Devaluation does not operate directly at the level of the individual or even the
social group; rather, it operates to affix a “gender” or “race” to a neutral activity
or category and simultaneously to place it on a hierarchy of value. What is
devalued is the entire category at issue, whether it is women’s work, housework,
part-time work, emotional harm, “feminine” behavior or [B]lack life. 76

It is interesting that, twenty years before the Black Lives Matter movement,
Professor Chamallas recognized that Black lives may be a devalued category. 77
Her devaluation theory and the Black Lives Matter movement embrace the same
understanding. The category—here, life—is neutral, but once race is affixed to
it, it is placed in a hierarchical value system, with Black life ranking near or at
75. Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and
Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 772 (2001).
76. Id. (citations omitted).
77. Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PENN.
L. REV. 463, 471–74 (1998) (writing about using the death penalty as an example to prove
devaluation).
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the very bottom. It remains necessary to proclaim that Black Lives Matter
because historically and presently our systems have repeatedly devalued the
entire category of Black life. 78 In Texas—and throughout the nation—the
category of “murder victim” is also neutral. But the data shows that when race
is added to include Black murder victims, the entire category is devalued. This
devaluation has been happening to anything affixed to Blackness throughout
American history.
Unlike criminal law, tort law provides disturbing proof of the historical
devaluation of Black lives because it requires putting an actual monetary value
on those lives. American tort doctrine was shaped through railroad injury cases
in the mid to late nineteenth century, a time when railroad companies faced
thousands of lawsuits for causing injuries. 79 To avoid trials and settle claims,
railroad companies organized claims agents to devalue Blacks. 80 In her article,
Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900–1949, Professor Jennifer Wriggins
explains that “[a]n influential text for railroad claims agents published in 1927
endorsed racial inequality in claims practices” 81 and “explain[ed] that juries did
not value the life of a [B]lack man equally with that of a white man . . . .”82 The
manual addressed the significance of race in determining the settlement value
for cases, explaining that “[a] brakeman is not always a brakeman. A white
brakeman is a brakeman; but a negro brakeman is most likely only a negro.” 83
As a result of this devaluing by claims agents, railway companies and other
transportation industries had lessened incentives to prevent injuries to Blacks
because their injuries were less costly. 84 Devaluation is not confined to simply
failing to recognize an abstract value. It can result in physical harm, or at least
in a failure to adequately protect from harm.
The legal incentive to offer less protection to Black lives works to further
devalue those lives. This is highlighted in more recent tort cases in which race
is raised as a meaningful data point for valuation. In McMillan v. City of New
York, a 2008 case from the Eastern District of New York, the African American
male plaintiff suffered a severe spinal cord injury in a ferryboat crash. 85 As
evidence related to damage computation at trial, the defendant’s expert relied on
78. Kevin Cokley, We Need Leaders to Affirm that Black Lives Matter, Not Exploit the Phrase
to Divide Us, USA TODAY (July 13, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion
/2020/07/13/black-lives-matter-exploited-for-political-economic-gain-column/5397072002/
[https://perma.cc/HX7V-MTJ3].
79. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900–1949, 49 HOW. L.J. 99,
108 (2005).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 109 (referencing SMITH R. BRITTINGHAM, THE CLAIM AGENT AND HIS WORK:
INVESTIGATION AND SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL INJURIES 270–71 (1927)).
82. Id. (quoting BRITTINGHAM, supra note 81).
83. Id. (quoting BRITTINGHAM, supra note 81).
84. Wriggins, supra note 79, at 110.
85. 253 F.R.D. 247, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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data showing that African Americans who experience spinal cord injuries were
likely to have a shorter life expectancy after such injury “than persons of other
‘races’ with similar injuries.” 86 Writing for the District Court, Judge Jack
Weinstein held that such race-based statistical evidence was impermissible
because it was based on the biological fiction of race and the unreliability of race
statistics. 87 To Justice Weinstein’s credit, he recognized the dangers of using
race to determine value. However, it is often difficult to disentangle the
institutional aspect of racism from evidence impacting value in a case.
Lead paint cases are useful examples of how institutional racism, Black
devaluation, and legal evidence intertwine. Despite prohibitions on the sale of
lead-based paint since 1978, the Environmental Protection Agency has indicated
as recently as 2011 that lead poisoning remains the top environmental health
threat to children six years of age and younger in the United States. 88 Lead paint
poisoning disproportionately affects low income areas, 89 which means
communities of color suffer disproportionately from lead poisoning. 90 In 2017,
it was reported that the Black population in the United States has the highest rate
of poverty—a staggering 24.1% compared to 9.1% for the white population. 91
Given the prevalence of lead paint and other lead hazards in poverty-stricken
areas, Black children are “nearly three times more likely than white children to
have elevated blood-lead levels.” 92 In their study, The Racial Ecology of Lead
Poisoning: Toxic Inequality in Chicago Neighborhoods, 1995-2013, Harvard
Sociologists Robert J. Sampson and Alix S. Winter concluded that there were
“extraordinarily high rates of lead toxicity” in Black and Latino neighborhoods,
with “prevalence rates topping 90% of the child population.” 93 As the authors
explained, “lead toxicity is a source of ecological inequity by race and a pathway

86. Id.
87. Id. at 248–53.
88. See Donna Heron, Lead Poisoning: Number One Environmental Health Threat to
Children Ages Six and Younger in the U.S., ENV’T PROT. AGENCY (Oct. 25, 2011), https://archive
.epa.gov/epapages/newsroom_archive/newsreleases/5e312cbe6666dca8852579340068ebef.html
[https://perma.cc/473Q-9UXS].
89. David E. Jacobs et al., The Prevalence of Lead-Based Paint Hazards in U.S. Housing, 110
ENV’T. HEALTH PERSP. A599, A606 (2002) (finding that thirty-five percent of low-income housing
within the United States contained lead-based paint hazards).
90. Emily A. Benfer, Contaminated Childhood: The Chronic Lead Poisoning of Low-Income
Children and Communities of Color in the United States, HEALTH AFFS. (Aug. 8, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170808.061398/full/ [https://perma.cc/Y797-JX
Z4].
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Robert J. Sampson & Alix S. Winter, The Racial Ecology of Lead Poisoning: Toxic
Inequality in Chicago Neighborhoods, 1995-2013, 13 DU BOIS REV. 261, 279 (2016), https://schol
ar.harvard.edu/files/alixwinter/files/sampson_winter_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KAR-PYVR].
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through which racial inequality literally gets into the body.” 94 This “ecological
inequality” plays out as inequality in the court system as well. In calculating
damages, courts have traditionally allowed the introduction of evidence of a
plaintiff’s “life expectancy, worklife expectancy, and average income values
particularized to the plaintiff’s gender and, where available, race.” 95 So, when
Black and Latino children are injured by lead paint, and their lost future earning
capacity is assessed, race-based predictive tables are often used. 96 This results
in that group—Black and Latino children—systematically receiving
considerably lower awards than would other groups, especially whites. 97 The
devaluation of these young Black and Latino lives results in the defendants—
typically public housing authorities and landlords in low-income areas—having
a lessened incentive to maintain the health standards of their properties. 98 That
reduced incentive works to the detriment of Black and Latino children who
disproportionately live in low-income or government housing. 99 And the cycle
continues.
1.

The Implicit Devaluation of Black Lives

Tort law outcomes show how the devaluation of Black lives plays out in
explicit terms—through damage prediction charts. Perhaps unsurprisingly, tort
law is also a vehicle for implicit racial bias to pervade. In their study, Do Black
Injuries Matter?: Implicit Bias and Jury Decision Making in Tort Cases,
Professors Johnathan Cardi, Valerie Hans, and Gregory Parks found that “the
dollar awards for the injuries suffered by [B]lack plaintiffs were lower than
awards for the same injuries experienced by white plaintiffs.” 100 When award
decisions were broken down by the actual decision maker, the study found that
participants with higher implicit bias scores 101 “attributed significantly more
94. Id.
95. Ronen Avraham & Kimberly Yuracko, Torts and Discrimination, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 661,
666 (2017) (citing Watson v. S. Shore Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 965 N.E.2d 1200, 1209 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2012) (using a race and gender government table to estimate the life expectancy of a Black
male); Probst v. Wroten, 433 So. 2d 734, 744 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (authorizing gender-based worklife expectancy tables despite the plaintiff’s objection); Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 294
N.W.2d 501, 527 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (using race-based yearly government salary tables), aff’d,
301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981)).
96. Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the
Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1432, 1440–41 (2015).
97. Id.
98. Id.; see generally Laura Greenberg, Compensating the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals
for Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 429 (2001).
99. Chamallas, supra note 96.
100. Johnathan Cardi et al., Do Black Injuries Mater?: Implicit Bias and Jury Decision Making
in Torts Cases, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 507–08 (2020).
101. Id. at 536–37 (“The lower the score, the weaker the negative association with AfricanAmerican faces and positive association with Caucasian faces; the higher the score, the stronger
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legal responsibility to [B]lack defendants than to white defendants and
recommended higher awards for plaintiffs who sued [B]lack defendants.” 102
Implicit racial bias “describes the cognitive processes whereby, despite even the
best intentions, people automatically classify information in racially biased
ways.” 103 The Race Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) 104 used in the tort
damages study measures the reaction time in which individuals associate traits
(pleasant meaning words and unpleasant meaning words) with images of Black
and white faces. 105 The purpose of the IAT is to assesses implicit attitudes
toward Blacks versus whites. In the torts study, participants were assigned
scenarios in which fictitious plaintiff’s, varied by race (Black and white), were
injured. 106 Participants were asked to assess the legal responsibility of the
defendants and the level of damages the plaintiffs deserved. 107 After completing
the torts exercise, the study participants took the Black-white Race IAT. 108
Though the overall results of tort the study are complex and require further
inquiry, the observations do raise interesting connections to the death penalty
context.
As previously discussed, capital jurors routinely undervalue Black lives.
Interestingly, the torts study found that the plaintiff’s race did not affect the
participants’ liability determinations. 109 However, the study did conclude that
“[B]lack plaintiffs were awarded lesser damages than white plaintiffs in suits
between individuals[,]” though it was unclear whether that difference was
actually attributed to race. 110 Race was also not found to be a factor in the
amount of damages awarded overall. 111 However, the implicit bias level of the
participant did seem to make a difference, though the explanations were
complicated. Ultimately, the study concluded that “[t]he higher the participant

the negative association with African-American faces and positive association with Caucasian
faces.”).
102. Id. at 507.
103. Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 795, 797 (2012).
104. See Frequently Asked Questions, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit
/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/5GYA-PXKW] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (“The Implicit Association
Test (IAT) [comes in the form of an online test that] measures the strength of associations between
concepts (e.g., black people, gay people) and evaluations (e.g., good, bad) or stereotypes (e.g.,
athletic, clumsy).”).
105. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition:
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1464 (1998); see also IMPLICIT
MEASURES OF PERSONALITY 1, 6 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007).
106. Cardi et al., supra note 100, at 531.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 532.
109. Id. at 550.
110. Id. at 552.
111. Cardi et al., supra note 100, at 552.
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IAT score, the less likely a white defendant was held liable[.]” 112 In other words,
the more a participant implicitly favored whites over Blacks, the less likely that
participant was to hold white defendants liable for a plaintiff’s injuries.
Additionally, the study found that “high IAT scorers ordered [B]lack defendants
to pay more than white defendants—this was true regardless of the race of the
plaintiff.” 113 These results suggest that it matters—to the juror holding an antiBlack implicit bias—that whites are often less responsible for their damaging
actions and that, when Blacks are responsible for hurting others, they ought to
pay more dearly. These results match perfectly with what our data reveals in the
death penalty cases in Texas. Blacks are seen as more deserving of the harshest
punishment—the death penalty—when they wrong others. Add to this that
whites are seen as generally less liable, then it stands to reason that when there
is a white victim in a death penalty case, the perpetrator must pay a significant
price—oftentimes with their life. The life or death challenge in the capital
context is that researchers using the IAT have discovered that the majority of
tested Americans carry implicit negative attitudes toward Blacks and associate
Blacks with negative stereotypes. 114 Of course, screening civil jurors for their
implicit bias levels is not a part of jury voir dire, so we can expect varying levels
of implicit bias among jurors. 115 This is especially significant in the death
penalty process where capital jurors are overwhelmingly white and male—a
group that has higher levels of implicit bias against Black people. 116 In this way,
bias that is implicit is just as deadly as the explicit.
2.

Historic Devaluation: The Legal Meaning of Blackness

Whether explicit or implicit, Black lives have been devalued from the
moment they were forcibly brought to America. The explicit devaluation has
been intertwined with the development of our American understandings of what
race means and how one comes to be recognized as Black. The infamous “one112. Id. at 551.
113. Id.
114. Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a
Demonstration Website, 6 GRP. DYNAMICS 101, 101 (2002) (“[T]he data collected are rich in
information regarding the operation of attitudes and stereotypes, most notably the strength of
implicit attitudes, the association and dissociation between implicit and explicit attitudes, and the
effects of group membership on attitudes and stereotypes.”); see also Laurie A. Rudman & Richard
D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Association Test, 10 GRP. PROCESSES & INTERGROUP
REL. 359, 361 (2007) (discussing studies that show scores on the Implicit Association Test are
linked to harmful group behaviors).
115. Judge Mark W. Bennett has suggested screening potential jurors for potential bias. See
Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions,
4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 170 (2010).
116. Shervin Assari, Interaction Between Race and Gender on Implicit Racial Bias Against
Blacks, INT. J. EPIDEMIOLOGIC RES. 43, 47 (2018).
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drop rule” used in determining who is Black, and thus not entitled to the
privileges of whiteness, is an example of the enduring American tenet of
equating Blackness with a depreciative effect. In his book, Who Is Black? One
Nation’s Definition, Professor F. James Davis describes the one-drop rule in this
manner:
To be considered [B]lack in the United States not even half of one’s ancestry
must be African [B]lack. But will one-fourth do, or one-eighth, or less? The
nations answer to the question “Who is black?” has long been that a [B]lack is
any person with any known African [B]lack ancestry. This definition reflects
the long experience with slavery and later with Jim Crow segregation. In the
South it became known as the “one-drop rule,” meaning that a single drop of
“black blood” makes a person a [B]lack. It is also known as the “one black
ancestor rule,” some courts have called it the “traceable amount rule,” and
anthropologists call it the “hypo-descent rule,” meaning that racially mixed
persons are assigned the status of the subordinate group. This definition emerged
from the American South to become the nation’s definition, generally accepted
by whites and [B]lacks. Blacks had no other choice. As we shall see, this
American cultural definition of [B]lacks is taken for granted as readily by
judges, affirmative action officers, and [B]lack protesters as it is by Ku Klux
Klansmen. 117

Thus, any so-called drop of Blackness made a person legally and socially
Black. As Professor Davis explains, the one-drop rule is uniquely American
because “[n]ot only does the one-drop rule apply to no other group than
American [B]lacks, but apparently the rule is unique in that it is found only in
the United States and not in any other nation in the world.” 118 And because
American courts used Blackness to uphold slavery, 119 deny citizenship to
Blacks, 120 and maintain race-based segregation that was oppressive to Black

117. F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? ONE NATION’S DEFINITION (1991), partially reprinted
by
PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/jefferson/mixed/onedrop.html
[https://perma.cc/MKK8-KT99] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., State v. John Mann, 13 N.C. 263 (1829) (holding that the cruel and unreasonable
battery on a slave by the hirer is not indictable because “[t]he power of the master must be absolute
to render the submission of the slave perfect.”); see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 625–
26, 645–46 (1842) (upholding the Fugitive Slave Law because enslaved Blacks were property and
retrieving “this species of property” was vital to slave masters’ interests).
120. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 404, 406 (1856) (denying U.S. citizenships to
Blacks because, at the nation’s founding Blacks were “considered as a subordinate and inferior
class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not,
yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held
the power and the Government might choose to grant them.”).
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people, 121 this also meant that one drop of Blackness legally depreciated the
value of the human.
We see this depreciative Black effect in property law and policy as well.
Treating Blackness as a factor that devalues property was done explicitly in the
case of redlining. In 1933, the federal government created the Home Owners’
Loan Corporation (“HOLC”) to increase home ownership as a response to the
housing crisis during the Depression. The detrimental legacy of the redlining
approach to mortgage lending is explored in full in Richard Rothstein’s
informative book, The Color of Law. 122 Rothstein explains that:
The HOLC created color coded maps of every metropolitan area in the nation,
with the safest neighborhoods colored green and the riskiest colored red. A
neighborhood earned a red color if African Americans lived in it, even if it was
a solid middle-class neighborhood of single-family homes. 123

While redlining of this sort clearly impeded the creation of wealth among
Black families, 124 it also illustrates that the presence of Blackness diminished
the valuation of white areas as well. Areas where whites lived could get a green
rating if, HOLC appraisers determined that “it had ‘not a single foreigner of
negro.’” 125 It is within this context of devaluation and depreciation that the racial
disparities in the death penalty sit—where the presence of even one Black victim
devalues the victim pool and lessens the risk that a jury will determine that the
defendant owes society their life. Similar to what happens in capital cases, the
Black devaluation effect in property law, while once clearly explicit, still exists
in an implicit form. Recent reports reveal that, not only are Black neighborhoods
still undervalued, 126 but that even Black homeowners in affluent areas have their
individual homes undervalued by appraisers. 127 What all of these examples show
121. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1986) (upholding race-based segregation as not
violative of equal protection while at the same time recognizing that a Black man is not lawfully
entitled to the reputation of being a white man).
122. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW 64 (Liveright Publishing Corp. 2017).
123. Id.
124. Pedro da Costa, Housing Discrimination Underpins the Staggering Wealth Gap Between
Blacks and Whites, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.epi.org/blog/housing-discrimi
nation-underpins-the-staggering-wealth-gap-between-blacks-and-whites/ [https://perma.cc/A93M
-P6FT].
125. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 122, at 64.
126. ANDRE PERRY ET AL., BROOKINGS METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM, THE DEVALUATION OF
ASSETS IN BLACK NEIGHBORHOODS: THE CASE OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY (2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018.11_Brookings-Metro_Devaluation
-Assets-Black-Neighborhoods_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/QH85-ERUK]; see also Michelle
Singleterry, Being Black Lowers The Value Of My Home: The Legacy Of Redlining, WASH. POST
(Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/10/23/redlining-black-wealth/
[https://perma.cc/3SGC-SVWJ].
127. Debra Kamin, Black Homeowners Face Discrimination in Appraisals, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/realestate/blacks-minorities-appraisals-discrimi
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is that seeing Black lives as less valuable than white lives is not a new American
phenomenon, nor is it one that seems to be nearing an end.
CONCLUSION: THE LACK OF REDEMPTION FOR THE DEATH PENALTY
The racial disparities in the death penalty are not isolated. Instead, they fit
into the broader American legacy of racism and anti-Blackness. To ignore the
prevalence of Black lives mattering less, or to discount the realness of antiBlackness, is to completely misconstrue the context of the death penalty
statistics. Such misconstruction (whether based on actual misunderstanding or
willful blindness) encourages our legal system to develop strategies to deal with
racial disparities that will never lead to their eradication. When the death penalty
data is put in its proper historic and current context, it becomes clear that presentday America is unable to employ the death penalty in a racially just manner.
In Gregg v. Georgia, in 1976, the Supreme Court breathed life into the death
penalty by holding that capital punishment is not automatically
unconstitutional. 128 While the Gregg court confirmed the position from the 1972
Furman v. Georgia decision, that the death penalty cannot be applied in an
arbitrary manner, 129 the procedural protections against arbitrariness suggested
by the Court in Gregg completely ignore the reality of anti-Blackness as a basis
for death penalty decisions. The Court said that:
[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in
an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that
ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and
guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a system that
provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is
apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided
with standards to guide its use of the information. 130

However, bifurcated jury proceedings and jury guidance have nothing to do
with weeding out racial bias. The suggested protections against arbitrariness
focus on not letting the legal guilt of the offender infect the jury’s determination
of the appropriate punishment. But, that focus ignores what is really at stake in
capital cases—that jurors may deem a defendant more deserving of death if he
nation.html [https://perma.cc/DV6G-JDTP]; see also Robin Young & Sabrina McMahon, Biracial
Couple Gets Lower House Appraisal With Black Family Members Present, WBUR (Sept. 23,
2020), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2020/09/23/home-appraisal-bias-racism [https://perma
.cc/PCT7-H2QL].
128. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (“We now hold that the punishment of death
does not invariably violate the Constitution.”).
129. Id. at 189. (“Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a
matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action.”)
130. Id. at 195.
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kills white people than if he has even one Black victim. How does a bifurcated
jury protect against that risk? It simply does not. Race was the arbitrary factor
that led the Justices in Furman to say that it violates the constitution for the death
penalty to be applied in an arbitrary manner. 131 But, ever since Gregg shifted the
solution to process, racial bias has ceased to be recognized as the actual problem.
The Texas death penalty data shows how pervasive race is in death penalty
outcomes. Taken in sum, we see: a race of victim disparity in death sentences
overall; a race of victim disparity in death sentences sorted by race of defendant;
a race of victim disparity in death sentences sorted by weapon used; a race of
victim disparity in cases with a single victim; and a race of victim disparity in
multiple victim cases. Race is everywhere. Race is so prevalent that we even see
a race of victim disparity in non-death sentence cases. In every single
comparison, the racial disparity was statistically significant. In every single
comparison, harsher punishment was associated with white victims than with
African American victims, who clearly mattered less.
The truth, of course, is that Black victims matter as much as any, even if the
legal system and society have not recognized their value. And when they are
killed, it is not most likely in “a barroom quarrel” as Georgia’s assistant attorney
general speculated in McCleskey. 132 Roderick “Chip” Brownlow had just arrived
home from high school with his younger brother. 133 A good student and athlete
at Waco’s Connally High School, Chip was due to graduate in two weeks and
had plans to attend college. Chip’s cousin, Garvin Graves, who grew up with the
family and who he considered a brother, had just returned that day to spend the
summer at home from college in Pennsylvania.
Chip was not killed in a barroom quarrel. He died in his front yard, amidst
the tears and cries of his family. Terry Don Woodward’s family lived next door.
Woodward, with his neck decorated with a “white pride” message and gun in
hand, came after the Brownlows that day. Witnesses testified that he called out
a racial epithet and “I will kill you” before taking aim at Chip and his family.
Woodward fired his gun several times and ran across the Woodward property.
The family scattered and ducked for cover. But Chip Brownlow tripped and fell.
As Woodward loomed over him, Chip pled for his life. “He walked up and stood
over Chip,” Garvin Graves testified. “Chip was on the ground with his hands up
and was saying, ‘Please don’t shoot me. Don’t shoot me.’” Woodward shot Chip
131. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972).
132. MARATEA, supra note 31, at 88.
133. Imaeye Ibanga & Mike Anderson, Police Standoff Ends Peacefully, WACO TRIBUNEHERALD, May 15, 2003, at 1C; Tommy Witherspoon, Murder Trial Set to Begin in Waco, WACO
TRIBUNE-HERALD, Nov. 17, 2003, at 1C; Tommy Witherspoon, That’s the Man Who Shot Chip,
WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD, Nov. 19, 2003, at 1A; Tommy Witherspoon, Shooting Defendant Claims
Self Defense, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD, Nov. 20, 2003, at 1A; Tommy Witherspoon, Guilty
Verdict in Death of Teen, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD, Nov. 21, 2003, at 1A; Tommy Witherspoon,
Teen’s Killer Gets Life in Prison, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD, Nov. 22, 2003, at 1A.
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Brownlow at close range and then ran from the scene. Police located Woodward
the next day. A seven-hour standoff against members of five police agencies
ensued before Woodward was finally taken into custody.
Woodward was convicted of murder for the death of Chip Brownlow, and
aggravated assaulted for shooting at Chip’s younger brother. He was sentenced
to life in prison, with a thirty-year minimum. To the consternation and confusion
of some of the victim’s family, the death penalty was never sought.
Within a database of cases there are, of course, thousands of tragic stories
of lives upended by acts of an almost unspeakable nature. The details differ from
case to case. But across all those thousands of cases, the race of victim disparity
persists. The math is straightforward. Indeed, the odds against the patterns seen
here, emerging by chance, are truly astronomical. Which is to say, the penalties
imposed for killing Roderick “Chip” Brownlow and thousands of other African
Americans in Texas were less severe than the penalties imposed for killing
whites.
The race of the victim matters in the Texas criminal justice system. The
results are consistent with previous studies limited to several counties within
Texas that also found racial disparities in sentencing. Here, the authors present
the most comprehensive data ever assembled on capital murder cases in Texas
to affirm that the scope of the race of victim difference is jarring.
As a matter of jurisprudence and policy making, however, the meaning of
the data is uncertain. Baldus and colleagues argue that the courts have often
shrugged in response to race of victim disparities owing to “remedial
uncertainties” and “the potential political fallout” of declaring the system tainted
by discrimination. 134 When legislators debate the death penalty, racial disparities
are among the most frequently cited concerns of opponents of the death
penalty. 135 Findings of racial imbalance in Connecticut, 136 Maryland, 137 and
New Jersey 138 sentencing outcomes contributed to what were ultimately
successful efforts to abolish the death penalty in those states. 139 Supporters of
the death penalty, however, dispute both the math and the meaning of findings
of racial disparities, taking particular offense at the suggestion that race
influences sentencing or influences their own views. 140
After studying the matter in several states, Baldus and colleagues conclude
that eliminating the race of victim disparity in death sentences requires either
134. Baldus et al., supra note 15, at 169.
135. Niven & Donnelly, supra note 16.
136. Donohue III, supra note 13.
137. Id.
138. Baldus et al., supra note 15, at 144.
139. Scherzer, supra note 16, at 223 (arguing the proportionality review process in New Jersey
served to both limit the use of the death penalty in New Jersey and undergird arguments for
abolition).
140. See Niven & Donnelly, supra note 16.
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abolition of the death penalty or a severe narrowing of its application coupled
with close judicial scrutiny of racial patterns.141 These authors argue that
abolition is the only corrective approach. While many have focused that the
death penalty is unconstitutional because the race of the defendant is unduly
relevant, these authors argue that the effect of the victims’ race also warrants
abolition of the death penalty. This is not because the authors believe that the
death penalty ought to be applied more often to vindicate the loss of Black lives.
Rather, the persistent importance of the race of the victim in the death penalty
context demonstrates an area of law where Blackness is not seen as equal to
whiteness. The goal, then, is not simply to increase the application of the death
penalty to avenge more Black victims, but rather to recognize that the racial
outcomes in capital punishment teach us about the biases held in our society.
The death penalty is a tool for carrying out those biases. In keeping with the
momentum of today’s antiracism reckoning, abolishing the death penalty is the
only antiracist solution. It would dismantle an area of the law that allows for the
unbridled exercise of racial bias. Professor Ibram X. Kendi describes antiracism
as “a radical choice in the face of history, requiring a radical reorientation of our
consciousness.” 142 History shows us that Blackness has been devalued since the
founding of America. We must make the radical choice to uproot systems, like
the death penalty, that allow the anti-Black biases in our national consciousness
to not only thrive, but to be just. To do otherwise is to perpetuate a system where
Black lives matter less.

141. Baldus et al., supra note 15.
142. DR. IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST (2019).

